00 — A research initiative
AI4PG is a research initiative on mechanism design for public-goods funding, impact evaluation, and resource allocation. We convene mechanism designers and algorithmic economists with practitioners from impact evaluation, humanitarian finance, digital public infrastructure, and open source.
Columbia University · June 29–30, 2026
Open problems in mechanism design for public goods.
Up to $10k per AI4PG 2026 grant proposal.
Funders, labs, foundations and OS commons.
A publication on the design of allocation mechanisms.
In rebuttal · 202601 — Workshop · Columbia 2026
UPCOMINGA full-day workshop following UN Open Source Week 2026 at Columbia University. Mechanism designers, theoretical computer scientists, and empirically-oriented researchers of impact evaluation and funding allocation, together with practitioners who operate real allocation systems at scale.
Output: a workshop report mapping the open problems, promising designs, and the evidence we would need to discriminate between them.
Mechanism Design for Public GoodsFunding, Impact Evaluation & Resource Allocation in the Age of AI
Dates
Jun 29–30, 2026
Venue
Tang Hall · Columbia Engineering
Organizers
Xu · Dao
02 — Grants · AI4PG 2026
IN REBUTTALThe 2026 call for proposals closed on February 27. Submitted proposals were reviewed between March 1 and April 17. A rebuttal phase is underway; winning proposals will be announced at the end of April. Submissions and reviews are managed on OpenReview.
Supported by GainForest, Octant, Ethereum Foundation, Gitcoin, Funding the Commons, Hypercerts, Protocol Labs, and PL Research.
$10k.
Max award
12.
Research areas
7.
Organizers
Programme timeline
03 — Research threads
The workshop and the grants programme converge on a structured map of open problems in the design of allocation mechanisms for public goods, under realistic assumptions about evaluator capacity, measurement error, and strategic behaviour.
Thread 01
What are the comparative properties of prospective allocation mechanisms (including quadratic and matching-fund designs) versus retrospective, impact-based reward mechanisms, under realistic assumptions about evaluator capacity, measurement error, and strategic behavior?
Read threadThread 02
How should the outcomes of funded work be measured, attributed, and rewarded when the volume of funded projects grows faster than the supply of qualified evaluators? What mechanisms can credibly distinguish impactful work from plausible-looking work, especially when results unfold over years?
Read threadThread 03
How should provenance, attribution, and reviewer effort be incorporated into allocation mechanisms when a growing share of submitted material is machine-generated? What mechanisms can preserve informativeness when the cost of producing plausible submissions approaches zero?
Read threadThread 04
How should resources flow through networks of dependency and influence — software libraries, scientific citations, organizations delivering services to shared beneficiaries? Shapley-value and cooperative solution concepts, their computational tractability on real networks.
Read thread04 — Field notes
Visual timelines, infographics, essays, slide decks and embedded prototypes that sit alongside the formal research threads — published as we go.
05 — Organizers & collaborators
A coalition of mechanism designers, algorithmic economists, and programme managers across Columbia, ETH Zurich, HEC Paris, Cornell Tech, Zurich, and Protocol Labs.
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